|Abstract||Daniel Dennett's theory of intentionality has much to recommend it. Nevertheless, it could be significantly strengthened by addressing the causes of intentionality, that is, the mechanisms undelying intentional behavior. I will discuss three problems that a causal theory of intentionality could alleviate: attribution of rationality (or optimality), alternatives to sentential representation, and directedness of consciousness.|
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