Concepts are not a natural kind

Philosophy of Science 72 (3):444-467 (2005)
Abstract
In cognitive psychology, concepts are those data structures that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings
Keywords Cognitive Science  Concept  Mental  Natural Kinds  Psychology  Representation  Science
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    Edouard Machery (2010). Précis of Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.

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