David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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This volume provides an introduction to and review of key contemporary debates concerning connectionism, and the nature of explanation and methodology in cognitive psychology. The first debate centers on the question of whether human cognition is best modeled by classical or by connectionist architectures. The second centres on the question of the compatibility between folk, or commonsense, psychological explanation and explanations based on connectionist models of cognition. Each of the two sections includes a classic reading along with important responses, and concludes with a specially commissioned reply by the main contributor. The editorial introductions provide a comprehensive survey and map through the debates
|Keywords||Cognitive Psychology Connectionism Language Psychology Science Thought|
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Paul Smolensky, Constituent Structure and Explanation in an Integrated Connectionist/Symbolic Cognitive Architecture.
Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield, Reply to Clark and Smolensky: Do Connectionist Minds Have Beliefs?
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Jerry A. Fodor (1997). Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky's Solution Still Doesn't Work. Cognition 62 (1):109-19.
Susan Schneider (2009). LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room. Synthese 170 (2):235 - 250.
Thomas E. Dickins (2004). Social Constructionism as Cognitive Science. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (4):333–352.
Christopher D. Viger (2005). Learning to Think: A Response to the Language of Thought Argument for Innateness. Mind and Language 20 (3):313-25.
Christopher D. Viger (2001). Locking on to the Language of Thought. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):203-215.
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