Colour inversion problems for representationalism

Abstract
In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inver- sion scenarios are more damaging to externalist representationalist views than have been previously thought. More specifically, I argue that representationalists who endorse externalism about experiential content either have to become internalists about the content of propositional attitudes or they have to adopt a novel variety of externalism about the content of propositional attitudes. This novel type of propositional attitude externalism is investigated. It can be seen that adopting it forces one to reject Putnam
Keywords Color  Content  Epistemology  Proposition  Representationalism
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1998). Is Experiencing Just Representing? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663-670.
Ned Block (1998). Review: Is Experiencing Just Representing? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663 - 670.
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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Citations of this work BETA
Fiona Macpherson (2011). Taxonomising the Senses. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):123-142.

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