Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding: A Commentary on Lupyan

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):571-584 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The main aim of Lupyan’s paper is to claim that perception is cognitively penetrated and that this is consistent with the idea of perception as predictive coding. In these remarks I will focus on what Lupyan says about whether perception is cognitively penetrated, and set aside his remarks about epistemology. I have argued (2012) that perception can be cognitively penetrated and so I am sympathetic to Lupyan’s overall aim of showing that perception is cognitively penetrable. However, I will be critical of some of Lupyan’s reasoning in arguing for this position. I will also call for clarification of that reasoning. First, I will discuss what is meant by cognitive penetration and, in light of this, the sort of evidence that can be used to establish its existence. Second, I will question whether Lupyan establishes that all cases of cross-modal effects are cases of cognitive penetration. In doing so, I will suggest a form of cognitive penetration that has heretofore not been posited, and give an example of how one might test for its existence. Third, I will question whether Lupyan puts forward convincing evidence that categorical knowledge and language affect perception in a way that conclusively shows that cognitive penetration occurs. Fourth, I will closely examine Lupyan’s reply to the argument against cognitive penetration from illusion. I show that his reply is not adequate and that he misses a more straightforward reply that one could give. Fifth, I briefly concur with the remarks that Lupyan makes about the role of attention with respect to cognitive penetration. And finally, sixth, I spell out exactly what I think the relationship is between the thesis that predictive coding is the correct model of perception and the thesis that there is cognitive penetration.

Similar books and articles

Predictive coding? Yes, but from what source?Gregory Hickok - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):358-358.
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
The Sense of Self in the Phenomenology of Agency and Perception.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-16

Downloads
639 (#23,876)

6 months
81 (#47,336)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Fiona Macpherson
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception.Eric Mandelbaum - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):267-283.
Cognitive Penetration and Attention.Steven Gross - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8:1-12.
Direct perception and the predictive mind.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3145-3164.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations