David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 64 (3):309 - 321 (1991)
For the tradition, an action is rational if maximizing; for Gauthier, if expressive of a disposition it maximized to adopt; for me, if maximizing on rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes given one's prior preferences. Decision and Game Theory and their recommendations for choice need revamping to reflect this new standard for the rationality of preferences and choices. It would not be rational when facing a Prisoner's Dilemma to adopt or co-operate from Amartya Sen's "Assurance Game" or "Other Regarding" preferences. But there are preferences which it maximizes to adopt and co-operate from.
|Keywords||Gauthier Sen decision theory game theory prisoners dilemma desire preference co-operation rationality|
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Eric M. Cave (1998). Habituation and Rational Preference Revision. Dialogue 37 (02):219-.
Joe Mintoff (2000). Is Rational and Voluntary Constraint Possible? Dialogue 39 (02):339-.
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