Can the property Boom last?
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):225–246 (2001)
| Abstract | The contemporary Humean programme that seeks to combine property realism with the denial of necessary connections between distinct existences is flawed. Objects and properties by their very natures are entangled in such connections. It follows that modal notions cannot be reductively analysed by appeal to the concept property, not even if the reducing theory posits an abundant supply of entities to fall under that concept | |||||||||
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