David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In C. Tindale & C. Reed (eds.), Dialectics, Dialogue and Argumentation: An Examination of Douglas Walton's Theories of Reasoning and Argument. College Publications 45-57 (2010)
Presumption is a complex concept in law, affecting the dialogue setting. However, it is not clear how presumptions work in everyday argumentation, in which the concept of “plausible argumentation” seems to encompass all kinds of inferences. By analyzing the legal notion of presumption, it appears that this type of reasoning combines argument schemes with reasoning from ignorance. Presumptive reasoning can be considered a particular form of reasoning, which needs positive or negative evidence to carry a probative weight on the conclusion. For this reason, presumptions shift the burden of providing evidence or explanations onto the interlocutor. The latter can provide new information or fail to do so: whereas in the first case the new information rebuts the presumption, in the second case, the absence of information that the interlocutor could reasonably provide strengthen the conclusion of the presumptive reasoning. In both cases the result of the presumption is to strengthen the conclusion of the reasoning from lack of evidence. As shown in the legal cases, the effect of presumption is to shift the burden of proof to the interlocutor; however, the shift a presumption effects is only the shift of the evidential burden, or the burden of completing the incomplete knowledge from which the conclusion was drawn. The burden of persuasion remains on the proponent of the presumption. On the contrary, reasoning from definition in law is a conclusive proof, and shifts to the other party the burden to prove the contrary. This crucial difference can be applied to everyday argumentation: natural arguments can be divided into dialectical and presumptive arguments, leading to conclusions materially different in strength.
|Keywords||Burden of proof argumentation schemes legal reasoning|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Imran Aijaz, Jonathan McKeown-Green & Aness Webster (2013). Burdens of Proof and the Case for Unevenness. Argumentation 27 (3):259-282.
David Godden & Douglas Walton (2007). A Theory of Presumption for Everyday Argumentation. Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (2):313-346.
Michael Rescorla (2009). Shifting the Burden of Proof? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):86-109.
Thomas F. Gordon, Henry Prakken & Douglas N. Walton (2007). The Carneades Model of Argument and Burden of Proof. Artificial Intelligence 171 (10-15):875-896.
Fabrizio Macagno (2011). The Presumptions of Meaning. Informal Logic 31 (4):368-394.
Tim Dare & Justine Kingsbury (2008). Putting the Burden of Proof in Its Place: When Are Differential Allocations Legitimate? Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):503-518.
Gregor Betz (2009). Evaluating Dialectical Structures. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (3):283 - 312.
Michael McKenna (2010). Whose Argumentative Burden, Which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443.
Anthony Ellis (2010). War Crimes, Punishment and the Burden of Proof. Res Publica 16 (2):181-196.
Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton (2012). Presumptions in Legal Argumentation. Ratio Juris 25 (3):271-300.
Karen Petroski (2008). The Public Face of Presumptions. Episteme 5 (3):pp. 388-401.
Juha Räikkä (1997). Burden of Proof Rules in Social Criticism. Argumentation 11 (4):463-477.
Andrew Aberdein (2011). The Dialectical Tier of Mathematical Proof. In Frank Zenker (ed.), Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18--21, 2011. OSSA
Henry Prakken (2008). A Formal Model of Adjudication Dialogues. Artificial Intelligence and Law 16 (3):305-328.
Thorsten Sander (2003). Beweislastverteilung und Intuitionen in philosophischen Diskursen. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (1):69-97.
Added to index2011-01-30
Total downloads185 ( #20,431 of 1,938,585 )
Recent downloads (6 months)42 ( #11,908 of 1,938,585 )
How can I increase my downloads?