Synthese 170 (3):443 - 456 (2009)
|Abstract||Much of The Reason’s Proper Study is devoted to defending the claim that simply by stipulating an abstraction principle for the “number-of” functor, we can simultaneously fix a meaning for this functor and acquire epistemic entitlement to the stipulated principle. In this paper, I argue that the semantic and epistemological principles Hale and Wright offer in defense of this claim may be too strong for their purposes. For if these principles are correct, it is hard to see why they do not justify platonist strategies that are not in any way “neo-Fregean,” e.g. strategies that treat “the number of Fs” as a Russellian definite description rather than a singular term, or employ axioms that do not have the form of abstraction principles.|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Bob Hale & Crispin Wright, Focus Restored Comment on John MacFarlane's “Double Vision: Two Questions About the Neo-Fregean Programme”.
Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (2009). Focus Restored: Comments on John MacFarlane. Synthese 170 (3):457 - 482.
Bob Hale (2000). Reals by Abstractiont. Philosophia Mathematica 8 (2):100--123.
Bob Hale (ed.) (2001). The Reason's Proper Study: Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
Stewart Shapiro (2000). Frege Meets Dedekind: A Neologicist Treatment of Real Analysis. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (4):335--364.
Matti Eklund (2009). Bad Company and Neo-Fregean Philosophy. Synthese 170 (3):393 - 414.
Øystein Linnebo & Gabriel Uzquiano (2009). Which Abstraction Principles Are Acceptable? Some Limitative Results. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):239-252.
Alan Weir (2003). Neo-Fregeanism: An Embarrassment of Riches. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (1):13-48.
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2009). Solving the Caesar Problem Without Categorical Sortals. Erkenntnis 71 (2):141 - 155.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads38 ( #35,802 of 722,764 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,764 )
How can I increase my downloads?