David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 273-301 (1998)
We think that certain of our mental states represent the world around us, and represent it in determinate ways. My perception that there is salt in the pot before me, for example, represents my immediate environment as containing a certain object, a pot, with a certain kind of substance, salt, in it. My belief that salt dissolves in water represents something in the world around me, namely salt, as having a certain observational property, that of dissolving. But what exactly is the relation between such states and the world beyond the surfaces of our skins? Specifically, what exactly is the relation between the contents of those states, and the world beyond our bodies?
|Keywords||Externalism Mental States Norm|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Filip Buekens (1994). Externalism, Content, and Causal Histories. Dialectica 48 (3-4):267-86.
A. C. Genova (2007). Externalism and Token-Identity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):223-249.
Pierre Jacob (1992). Externalism and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (New Series):203-19.
Katalin Farkas (2006). Semantic Internalism and Externalism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press
Holger Lyre (2010). Erweiterte Kognition und mentaler Externalismus. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (2):190-215.
Sven Bernecker (1996). Davidson on First-Person Authority and Externalism. Inquiry 39 (1):121-139.
Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Externalism and First-Person Authority. Synthese 104 (1):99-122.
Nicholas Shea (2003). Does Externalism Entail the Anomalism of the Mental? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):201-213.
Joe Lau, Externalism About Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #656,769 of 1,790,117 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #426,070 of 1,790,117 )
How can I increase my downloads?