Emotional clichés and authentic passions: A phenomenological revision of a cognitive theory of emotion

This paper argues for an understanding of emotion based upon Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of embodiment and passivity. Through a critical assessment of cognitive theories of emotion, and in particular Solomon's theory, it argues (1) that there is a sense in which emotions may be judgments, so long as we understand such judgments as bodily enactments of meaning, but (2) that even understood in this way, the notion of judgment (or construal) can only account for a subset of emotions which I call "emotional clichés," and not for authentic passions. In contrast with Solomon's account which conceives the subject as constituting, this account of emotion requires us to understand subjectivity as moved by meanings in the world, and as sometimes, in an authentic passion, dispossessed by those meanings
Keywords Phenomenology  Emotion  Merleau-Ponty  Embodiment  Subjectivity  Solomon  Judgment  Contitution
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References found in this work BETA
Renaud Barbaras (2000). Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh. In Fred Evans & Leonard Lawlor (eds.). State University of New York Press 77-87.
R. G. Collingwood (1958). The Principles of Art. New York, Oxford University Press.
Donald Davidson (1976). Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride. Journal of Philosophy 73 (19):744-757.

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