Epistemic Modalities and Relative Truth

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I want to discuss a puzzle about the semantics of epistemic modals, like “It might be the case that” as it occurs in “It might be the case that Goldbach’s conjecture is false.”1 I’ll argue that the puzzle cannot be adequately explained on standard accounts of the semantics of epistemic modals, and that a proper solution requires relativizing utterance truth to a context of assessment, a semantic device whose utility and coherence I have defended elsewhere for future contingents (MacFarlane..
Keywords philpapers: relativism about truth
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Richard Heck (2006). MacFarlane on Relative Truth. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):88–100.

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