David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):350-367 (2008)
Aquinas argues that practical reasoning requires foundations: first practical principles (ultimate ends) grasped by us per se from which deliberation proceeds. Contrary to the thesis of an important paper of Terence Irwin's, I deny that Aquinas advances two inconsistent conceptions of the scope of deliberation and, correspondingly, two inconsistent accounts of the content of the first practical principles presupposed by deliberation. On my account, Aquinas consistently takes first practical principles to be highly abstract, general, or formal ends, ends subject to specification and determination by a process of reasoning. Aquinas therefore gives deliberation wide scope, allowing (indeed, requiring) it not only to settle for us the things that are for the sake of our ends but also to engage in determining in important respects what our ends are. Accordingly, I conclude that Aquinas's foundations in ethics are “thin.” Our natural grasp of first practical principles gives us very little in the way substantive ethical principles.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Thomas (2005). Thomas Aquinas: Disputed Questions on the Virtues. Cambridge University Press.
Scott MacDonald (1991). Ultimate Ends in Practical Reasoning: Aquinas's Aristotelian Moral Psychology and Anscombe's Fallacy. Philosophical Review 100 (1):31-66.
Scott MacDonald (1999). Practical Reasoning and Reasons-Explanations: Aquinas's Account of Reasons Role in Action. In Scott MacDonald & Eleonore Stump (eds.), Aquinas's Moral Theory. Cornell University Press.
Kevin White (2007). Aquinas on Purpose. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:133-147.
Daniel Westberg (1994). Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas. Oxford University Press.
Scott MacDonald (2001). Aquina's Ultimate Ends: A Reply to Grisez. American Journal of Jurisprudence 46 (1):37-49.
John R. Bowlin (1999). Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas's Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
R. Jay Wallace, Practical Reason. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Henry S. Richardson (1994). Practical Reasoning About Final Ends. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads23 ( #63,373 of 1,088,810 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,810 )
How can I increase my downloads?