Frege, Kant, and the logic in logicism

Philosophical Review 111 (1):25-65 (2002)
Let me start with a well-known story. Kant held that logic and conceptual analysis alone cannot account for our knowledge of arithmetic: “however we might turn and twist our concepts, we could never, by the mere analysis of them, and without the aid of intuition, discover what is the sum [7+5]” (KrV, B16). Frege took himself to have shown that Kant was wrong about this. According to Frege’s logicist thesis, every arithmetical concept can be defined in purely logical terms, and every theorem of arithmetic can be proved using only the basic laws of logic. Hence, Kant was wrong to think that our grasp of arithmetical concepts and our knowledge of arithmetical truth depend on an extralogical source—the pure intuition of time (Frege 1884, §89, §109). Arithmetic, properly understood, is just a part of logic.
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-111-1-25
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Sacha Golob (2013). Heidegger on Kant, Time and the 'Form' of Intentionality. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2):345 - 367.

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