How to be Psychologically Relevant
In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell (1995)
| Abstract | How did I raise my arm? The simple answer is that I raised it as a consequence of intending to raise it. A slightly more complicated response would mention the absence of any factors which would inhibit the execution of the intention- and a more complicated one still would specify the intention in terms of a goal (say, drinking a beer) which requires arm-raising as a means towards that end. Whatever the complications, the simple answer appears to be on the right track | |||||||||
| Keywords | Psychology Realism Relevance | |||||||||
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Jennifer Mckitrick (2005). Are Dispositions Causally Relevant? Synthese 144 (3):357 - 371.
Philip Kremer (1989). Relevant Predication: Grammatical Characterisations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (4):349 - 382.
Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Causal Relevance and Thought Content. Philosophical Quarterly 43 (176):334-53.
Kirk A. Ludwig (1994). Causal Relevance and Thought Content. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176):334-353.
L. Jonathan Cohen (1994). Some Steps Towards a General Theory of Relevance. Synthese 101 (2):171 - 185.
Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (1995). Causal Relevance and Explanatory Exclusion. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Larry Hauser (1994). Action Minus Movement: Wittgenstein's Question. Behavior and Philosophy 22 (1):23 - 28.
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