How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties

Published in the United States by Oxford University Press (2006)
Abstract
Penelope Mackie's book is a novel treatment of an issue central to much current work in metaphysics: the distinction between the essential and accidental properties of individuals. Mackie challenges widely held views, and arrives at what she calls "minimalist essentialism," an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. Mackie's clear and accessible discussions of issues surrounding necessity and essentialism mean that the book will appeal as much to graduate students as it will to seasoned metaphysicians.
Keywords Essentialism (Philosophy
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Call number B105.E65.M33 2006
ISBN(s) 0199562407   0199272204   9780199272204
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David Yates (2013). The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):93-128.

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