Published in the United States by Oxford University Press (2006)
|Abstract||Penelope Mackie's book is a novel treatment of an issue central to much current work in metaphysics: the distinction between the essential and accidental properties of individuals. Mackie challenges widely held views, and arrives at what she calls "minimalist essentialism," an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. Mackie's clear and accessible discussions of issues surrounding necessity and essentialism mean that the book will appeal as much to graduate students as it will to seasoned metaphysicians.|
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|Buy the book||$13.00 used (68% off) $31.74 new (21% off) $35.27 direct from Amazon (12% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||B105.E65.M33 2006|
|ISBN(s)||0199562407 0199272204 9780199272204|
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