David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In A. Beckermann & B. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 76-111 (2008)
This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. I t won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter exists while arguing that the fonner doesn't . Section I makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren't introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called "dual systems theories" of belief formation and decision making, The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Denis G. Arnold (1997). Introspection and its Objects. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):87-94.
Shaun Gallagher (2002). Experimenting with Introspection. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (9):374-375.
Shaun Nichols (2000). The Mind's "I" and the Theory of Mind's "I": Introspection and Two Concepts of Self. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):171-99.
Declan Smithies (2013). On the Unreliability of Introspection. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1177-1186.
Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (2012). Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Quassim Cassam (1995). Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Mit Press. 311--336.
William E. Lyons (1988). The Development of Introspection. Philosophical Perspectives 2:31-64.
Uljana Feest (2012). Introspection as a Method and Introspection as a Feature of Consciousness. Inquiry 55 (1):1 - 16.
Akhtar Imam (1966). Is the Substantial Self Known by Introspection. Pakistan Philosophical Congress 13 (May):92-99.
Fred Dretske (1994). Introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:263-278.
Daniel John Zizzo (2004). Introspection and Intuition in the Decision Sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):274-275.
Pierre Vermersch (1999). Introspection as Practice. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):17-42.
Göran Hermerén (1993). Emotive Properties: The Role of Abstraction, Introspection and Projection. Theoria 59 (1-3):80-112.
William E. Lyons (1985). The Behaviourists' Struggle with Introspection. International Philosophical Quarterly 25 (June):139-156.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2012-07-10
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?