Introspection and authoritative self-knowledge

Erkenntnis 67 (2):355 - 372 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper I outline and defend an introspectionist account of authoritative self-knowledge for a certain class of cases, ones in which a subject is both thinking and thinking about a current, conscious thought. My account is distinctive in a number of ways, one of which is that it is compatible with the truth of externalism
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References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1971). Varieties of Priveleged Access. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):223-41.
T. Burge (1998). Reason and the First Person U Knjizi Wright, C., Smith, B: C. And Macdonald, C. In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.
Tyler Burge (1988). Individualism and Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
Tyler Burge (1996). Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:91-116.

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