David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):101-130 (2004)
My concern in this paper is with a simple question: Does Donald Davidson's case for an anti-foundationalist epistemology cohere well with his stance on conceptual schemes? After rehearsing Davidson's central anti-foundationalist argument in Section 2, I consider the objection that his argument rests on a premise which is defensible only if we invoke the so-called "dualism of scheme and content", Davidson's opposition to which is the subject of Section 3. Then, in Section 4, I explain why, despite appearances to the contrary, there is actually no incompatibility between the premise of Davidson's anti-foundationalist argument and his insistence that the scheme / content dualism is untenable. Finally, in Section 5, I discuss what this reveals about the basic unity and orientation of Davidson's theory of knowledge.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael V. Antony (2003). Davidson's Argument for Monism. Synthese 135 (1):1-12.
Jesús Coll Mármol (2007). Conceptual Schemes and Empiricism: What Davidson Saw and McDowell Missed. Theoria 22 (2):153-165.
Jack S. Crumley (1989). Talking Lions and Lion Talk: Davidson on Conceptual Schemes. Synthese 80 (3):347-371.
Jack S. Crumley II (1989). Talking Lions and Lion Talk: Davidson on Conceptual Schemes. Synthese 80 (3):347 - 371.
Klaus Puhl (1994). Davidson on Intentional Content and Self-Knowledge. In Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Martin Coleman (2010). On the Very Good Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. The Pluralist 5 (2):69-86.
Ernest Sosa (2003). Davidson's Epistemology. In Kirk Ludwig (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy in Focus: Donald Davidson. Cambridge University Press.
Maria Baghramian (1998). Why Conceptual Schemes? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (3):287–306.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #74,487 of 1,410,532 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #38,533 of 1,410,532 )
How can I increase my downloads?