David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):30-30 (1997)
Can memory be cast as a system that meshes events to actions? This commentary considers the concepts of mesh versus association, arguing that thus far the distinction is inadequate. However, the goal of shifting to an action-based view of memory has merit, most notably in emphasizing memory as a skill and in focusing on processes as opposed to structures.
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