Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):59–78 (1998)
|Abstract||The paper offers an explanation of the intuitive appeal of Saul Kripke's necessity of origin thesis, exhibiting it as the consequence of a temporally asymmetrical 'branching model' of possibilities which, in turn, rests on two plausible principles concerning possibility, time, and identity. Unlike some other accounts, my explanation dissociates the necessity of origin thesis from a commitment to individual essences or other sufficient conditions for identity across possible worlds. I conclude that although the branching model is not irresistible, its rejection may necessitate the denial of a plausible principle that requires possibilities for actual individuals to be 'anchored' to their actual characteristics|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Harold W. Noonan (1985). The Closest Continuer Theory of Identity. Inquiry 28 (1-4):195 – 229.
By Sören Häggqvist (2006). Essentialism and Rigidity. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):275–283.
Steven Rieber (1998). The Concept of Personal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):581-594.
Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Christopher Hughes (2004). Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
Niko Strobach (1998). Time and Development in Kripke's “Naming and Necessity”. Theoria 13 (3):503-517.
Sonia Roca-Royes & Ross Cameron (2006). Rohrbaugh and deRosset on the Necessity of Origin. Mind 115 (458):361-366.
Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1998). Kripke on Necessity and Identity. Philosophical Papers 27 (3):151-159.
Guy Rohrbaugh & Louis deRosset (2004). A New Route to the Necessity of Origin. Mind 113 (452):705-725.
Roy W. Perrett & Charles Barton (1999). Personal Identity, Reductionism, and the Necessity of Origins. Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):277-94.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads36 ( #33,611 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #27,255 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?