Knowledge laundering: Testimony and sensitive invariantism
Analysis 65 (286):132–138 (2005)
| Abstract | According to “sensitive invariantism,” the word “know” expresses the same relation in every context of use, but what it takes to stand in this relation to a proposition can vary with the subject’s circumstances. Sensitive invariantism looks like an attractive reconciliation of invariantism and contextualism. However, it is incompatible with a widely-held view about the way knowledge is transmitted through testimony. If both views were true, someone whose evidence for p fell short of what was required for knowledge in her circumstances could come to know that p simply by feeding her evidence to someone in less demanding circumstances and then accepting his testimony. | |||||||||
| Keywords | knowledge subject sensitive invariantism testimony | |||||||||
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