Modularity and the flexibility of human cognition
Mind and Language 23 (3):263–272 (2008)
| Abstract | In The Architecture of the Mind, Carruthers proposes a new and detailed explanation for how human cognition could be both flexible and massively modular. The combinatorial nature of our linguistic faculty and our capacity to engage in inner speech are the cornerstones of this new explanation. Despite the ingenuity of this proposal, I argue that Carruthers has failed to explain how a massively modular mind could display the flexibility that is characteristic of human thought | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesPeter Carruthers (2008). Précis of the Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought. Mind and Language 23 (3):257–262.
Peter Carruthers (2006). Simple Heuristics Meet Massive Modularity. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition. Oxford University Press.
Dan Sperber (2005). Modularity and Relevance: How Can a Massively Modular Mind Be Flexible and Context-Sensitive. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Content. Oup.
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Peter Carruthers (2003). Moderately Massive Modularity. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Mind and Persons. Cambridge University Press.
Peter Carruthers (1998). Distinctively Human Thinking. In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. Cambridge.
Peter Carruthers (2006). The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell.
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