Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Human Cognition
| Abstract | : In The Architecture of the Mind , Carruthers proposes a new and detailed explanation for how human cognition could be both fl exible and massively modular. The combinatorial nature of our linguistic faculty and our capacity to engage in inner speech are the cornerstones of this new explanation. Despite the ingenuity of this proposal, I argue that Carruthers has failed to explain how a massively modular mind could display the fl exibility that is characteristic of human thought. | |||||||||
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