David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 38 (3):503-24 (2004)
It is widely accepted that physicalism faces its most serious challenge when it comes to making room for the phenomenal character of psychological experience, its so-called what-it-is-like aspect. The challenge has surfaced repeatedly over the past two decades in a variety of forms. In a particularly striking one, Frank Jackson considers a situation in which Mary, a brilliant scientist who knows all the physical facts there are to know about psychological experience, has spent the whole of her life in a black and white room. He asks, What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. (Jackson 1986: 130)
|Keywords||A Posteriori Concept Epistemology Experience Identity Physicalism|
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References found in this work BETA
John Locke (1995). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
Thomas Nagel (1986). The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press.
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Gilbert Harman (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Citations of this work BETA
William E. S. McNeill (2012). On Seeing That Someone is Angry. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):575-597.
Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
Bernard Molyneux (2011). On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.
Janet Levin (2008). Molyneux's Question and the Individuation of Perceptual Concepts. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):1 - 28.
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