Moral realism and cross-cultural normative diversity

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):830-830 (2005)
We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X05370142
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