Making sense of relative truth

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339 (2005)
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to make sense of relativism about truth. There are two key ideas. (1) To be a relativist about truth is to allow that a sentence or proposition might be assessment-sensitive: that is, its truth value might vary with the context of assessment as well as the context of use. (2) Making sense of relativism is a matter of understanding what it would be to commit oneself to the truth of an assessment-sensitive sentence or proposition.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,788
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Hartry Field (2009). Epistemology Without Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
John MacFarlane (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.

View all 57 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

137 ( #5,905 of 1,099,035 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

20 ( #7,224 of 1,099,035 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.