David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 11 (1-4):400 – 409 (1968)
An examination is made of the dispute between the proponents of rational explanation of actions and of the deductive nomological pattern of explanation. A rapprochement between these two positions is suggested, with the aim of accounting for the normative character of reasons for acting. It is argued that the disputed area is an area of intersection between facts and values, and that far from it being the case that the normative and descriptive components can be separated or isolated, the underlying precepts are to be viewed as both explanatory (descriptive) and normative. The discussion is divided into two general areas: (1) the normative force of reasons for acting; and (2) the normative character of rationality.
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Brandt, Jaegwon Kim & Sidney Morgenbesser (1963). Wants as Explanations of Actions. Journal of Philosophy 60 (15):425-435.
Donald Davidson (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.
William H. Dray (1979). Laws and Explanation in History. Greenwood Press.
Theodore Mischel (1966). Pragmatic Aspects of Explanation. Philosophy of Science 33 (1/2):40-60.
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