Norm and law in the theory of action

Inquiry 11 (1-4):400 – 409 (1968)
An examination is made of the dispute between the proponents of rational explanation of actions and of the deductive nomological pattern of explanation. A rapprochement between these two positions is suggested, with the aim of accounting for the normative character of reasons for acting. It is argued that the disputed area is an area of intersection between facts and values, and that far from it being the case that the normative and descriptive components can be separated or isolated, the underlying precepts are to be viewed as both explanatory (descriptive) and normative. The discussion is divided into two general areas: (1) the normative force of reasons for acting; and (2) the normative character of rationality.
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DOI 10.1080/00201746808601536
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Donald Davidson (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.

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