Nonindexical contextualism

Synthese 166 (2):231--250 (2009)
Abstract
Philosophers on all sides of the contextualism debates have had an overly narrow conception of what semantic context sensitivity could be. They have conflated context sensitivity (dependence of truth or extension on features of context) with indexicality (dependence of content on features of context). As a result of this conflation, proponents of contextualism have taken arguments that establish only context sensitivity to establish indexicality, while opponents of contextualism have taken arguments against indexicality to be arguments against context sensitivity. Once these concepts are carefully pulled apart, it becomes clear that there is conceptual space in semantic theory for nonindexical forms of contextualism that have many advantages over the usual indexical forms.
Keywords time & tense seminar
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,085
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Keith DeRose (1992). Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Keith DeRose (2000). Now You Know It, Now You Don't. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:91-106.

View all 31 references

Citations of this work BETA
Hartry Field (2009). Epistemology Without Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.

View all 44 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

160 ( #4,487 of 1,101,652 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

12 ( #15,307 of 1,101,652 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.