Synthese 166 (2):231--250 (2009)
|Abstract||Philosophers on all sides of the contextualism debates have had an overly narrow conception of what semantic context sensitivity could be. They have conflated context sensitivity (dependence of truth or extension on features of context) with indexicality (dependence of content on features of context). As a result of this conflation, proponents of contextualism have taken arguments that establish only context sensitivity to establish indexicality, while opponents of contextualism have taken arguments against indexicality to be arguments against context sensitivity. Once these concepts are carefully pulled apart, it becomes clear that there is conceptual space in semantic theory for nonindexical forms of contextualism that have many advantages over the usual indexical forms.|
|Keywords||time & tense seminar|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ram Neta (2007). Contextualism and a Puzzle About Seeing. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):53-63.
Elke Brendel (2005). Why Contextualists Cannot Know They Are Right: Self-Refuting Implications of Contextualism. Acta Analytica 20 (2):38-55.
Wayne A. Davis (2004). Are Knowledge Claims Indexical? Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):257 - 281.
Martin Montminy (2007). Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction. Synthese 155 (1):99 - 125.
Berit Brogaard (2009). Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth: On Cappelen and Hawthorne's Relativism and Monadic Truth. Philosophical Books 50 (4):213-226.
Jonas Åkerman & Patrick Greenough (2010). Hold the Context Fixed, Vagueness Still Remains. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Oxford University Press.
Wayne A. Davis (forthcoming). On Nonindexical Contextualism. Philosophical Studies.
John MacFarlane (2007). Semantic Minimalism and Nonindexical Contextualism. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads138 ( #3,076 of 549,078 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #5,461 of 549,078 )
How can I increase my downloads?