David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Noûs 38 (3):503-524 (2004)
It is widely accepted that physicalism faces its most serious challenge when it comes to making room for the phenomenal character of psychological experience, its so-called what-it-is-like aspect. The challenge has surfaced repeatedly over the past two decades in a variety of forms. In a particularly striking one, Frank Jackson considers a situation in which Mary, a brilliant scientist who knows all the physical facts there are to know about psychological experience, has spent the whole of her life in a black and white room. He asks, What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. (Jackson 1986: 130)
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Naomi M. Eilan (ed.) (1993). Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Gareth Evans (1985). Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.
Owen J. Flanagan, Ned Block & Guven Guzeldere (eds.) (1997). The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.
Jerry Fodor (1990). Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs. In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press. 63--79.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). There Are No Recognitional Concepts, Not Even RED. Philosophical Issues 9:1-14.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Luca Malatesti (2008). Mary's Scientific Knowledge. Prolegomena 7 (1):37-59.
Philip Pettit (2004). Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. Mit Press. 105--142.
Gabriel Rabin (2011). Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.
E. Diaz-Leon (2009). How Many Explanatory Gaps Are There? APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8 (2):33-35.
Paul Raymont (1999). The Know-How Response to Jackson's Knowledge Argument. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):113-26.
Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.) (2007/2009). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Cynthia Macdonald (2004). Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal Concepts. Noûs 38 (3):503-24.
Sven Walter (2002). Terry, Terry, Quite Contrary. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):103-22.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads5 ( #256,176 of 1,410,448 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #177,872 of 1,410,448 )
How can I increase my downloads?