Note on conceivability and logical possibility
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Kinesis 2:39--42 (1969)
A. Collins once argued that time travel is only imaginable if we relate the "event" out of context. John Hospers argues that it is logically possible for an iron bar to float in water even if it is actually (empirically) impossible. My point in this piece is that Hospers relies on viewing the floating out of context, in Walt Disney fashion; but that is no way to establish any kind of possibility. I also discuss "conceivability", a term frequently used either to clarify logical possibility or to interchange for the same. I argue that it cannot do either.
|Keywords||Conceivability, Epistemology, Imaginability, Possibility|
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