David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 44 (4):455 – 480 (2001)
This essay critically engages Dreyfus's widely read interpretation of Heidegger's Being and Time . It argues that Dreyfus's reading is rooted in two primary claims or interpretative principles. The first - the Cartesianism thesis - indicates that Heidegger's objective in Being and Time is to overturn Cartesianism. The second - the hermeneutics of suspicion thesis - claims that Division II is supposed to suspect and throw into question the results of the Division I analysis. These theses contribute to the view that there are two conflicting accounts of inauthenticity that threaten the coherence of Heidegger's notion of authenticity. This view concerning authenticity is mistaken, as are the two theses that support it. The first thesis is incorrect because Heidegger's explicit aim is to investigate the question of the meaning of being not to overturn Cartesianism. The second is incorrect because the analyses of Division I describe the structures of everyday human existence in preparation for a closer examination in Division II of what makes them possible. Division II does not undercut Division I; it carries the analysis deeper. Authenticity, then, is not a negation of everydayness; it is a deepening of the self-understanding expressed in everydayness.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
R. Matthew Shockey (2012). Heidegger's Descartes and Heidegger's Cartesianism. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):285-311.
Similar books and articles
Edgar C. Boedeker Jr (2002). Phenomenological Ontology or the Explanation of Social Norms?: A Confrontation with William Blattner's Heidegger's Temporal Idealism. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 84 (3):334-344.
Tanja Staehler (2007). How is a Phenomenology of Fundamental Moods Possible? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):415 – 433.
Hubert L. Dreyfus & Jane Rubin (1987). You Can't Get Something for Nothing: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on How Not to Overcome Nihilism. Inquiry 30 (1 & 2):33 – 75.
Taylor Carman (1994). On Being Social: A Reply to Olafson. Inquiry 37 (2):203 – 223.
Carleton B. Christensen (1998). Getting Heidegger Off the West Coast. Inquiry 41 (1):65 – 87.
Yoko Arisaka (1995). Heidegger's Theory of Space: A Critique of Dreyfus. Inquiry 38 (4):455 – 467.
Frederick A. Olafson (1994). Heidegger la Wittgenstein or 'Coping' with Professor Dreyfus. Inquiry 37 (1):45 – 64.
William F. Bracken (2005). Is There a Puzzle About How Authentic Dasein Can Act?: A Critique of Dreyfus and Rubin on Being and Time, Division II. Inquiry 48 (6):533 – 552.
Elizabeth Ewing (1995). Authenticity in Heidegger: A Response to Dreyfus. Inquiry 38 (4):469 – 487.
Matheson Russell (2008). Is There a Hermeneutics of Suspicion in Being and Time? Inquiry 51 (1):97 – 118.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads26 ( #77,062 of 1,410,463 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #75,847 of 1,410,463 )
How can I increase my downloads?