David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 57 (2):205 - 224 (1983)
Psychiatrists are frequently called upon to make assessments of the rationality or irrationality of persons for a variety of medical-legal purposes. A key category is that of evaluations of a patient's capacity to grant informed consent for a medical procedure. A diagnosis of mental illness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a finding of incompetence. The notion of competency to grant consent, which is a mixed psychiatric-legal concept, shares some features with philosophical conceptions of rationality, but differs from them in a number of important respects. This article describes the actual practice of psychiatrists when making such judgments, along with the standards of competency they employ. A comparison is made between those notions of competency and predominant philosophical conceptions of rationality.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John Rawls (1971/2005). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
Alan Gewirth (1978). Reason and Morality. University of Chicago Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Richard Reiner (1995). Arguments Against the Possibility of Perfect Rationality. Minds and Machines 5 (3):373-89.
Gareth S. Owen, Fabian Freyenhagen, Genevra Richardson & Matthew Hotopf (2009). Mental Capacity and Decisional Autonomy: An Interdisciplinary Challenge. Inquiry 52 (1):79 – 107.
Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Rationalist Restrictions and External Reasons. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):39 - 57.
Constance E. Roland & Richard M. Foxx (2003). Self-Respect: A Neglected Concept. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):247 – 288.
Milan Zafirovski (2003). What is Rationality? Selected Conceptions From Social Theory. Social Epistemology 17 (1):13 – 44.
Xavier Vanmechelen (1998). Does Rationality Presuppose Irrationality. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):126 – 139.
Deborah Bowman (2011). Informed Consent: A Primer for Clinical Practice. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads21 ( #177,578 of 1,796,206 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #98,157 of 1,796,206 )
How can I increase my downloads?