Property Dualism and Substance Dualism

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):181-199 (2011)
Abstract
I attempt to rebut Dean Zimmerman's novel argument (2010), which he presents in support of substance dualism, for the conclusion that, in spite of its popularity, the combination of property dualism with substance materialism represents a precarious position in the philosophy of mind. I take issue with Zimmerman's contention that the vagueness of ‘garden variety’ material objects such as brains or bodies makes them unsuitable candidates for the possession of phenomenal properties. I also argue that the ‘speculative materialism’ that is available to a substance materialist property dualist who abandons the identification of persons with such garden variety objects is significantly more attractive than Zimmerman allows. Although I do not attempt to refute its substance dualist rival, I conclude that the combination of property dualism with substance materialism can withstand Zimmerman's objections
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References found in this work BETA
Eric T. Olson (2002). Personal Identity. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.

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Dean Zimmerman (2010). From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119 - 150.
William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
Gordon Barnes (2001). Should Property-Dualists Be Substance-Hylomorphists? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:285-299.
Christina Van Dyke (2009). Not Properly a Person. Faith and Philosophy 26 (2):186-204.
D. Jehle (2006). Kim Against Dualism. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):565-78.
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