Précis of doing without concepts

Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611 (2010)
Abstract
Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts. Doing without Concepts (Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts
Keywords categorization   concept   concept combination   dual-process   eliminativism   exemplar   induction   meaning   natural kinds   prototype   reference   theory
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References found in this work BETA
Lawrence W. Barsalou (1999). Perceptual Symbol Systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.

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