David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611 (2010)
Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts. Doing without Concepts (Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts
|Keywords||categorization concept concept combination dual-process eliminativism exemplar induction meaning natural kinds prototype reference theory|
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References found in this work BETA
L. W. Barsalou (1982). Context-Independent and Context-Dependent Information in Concepts. Memory and Cognition 10:82-93.
Lawrence Barsalou (1987). The Instability of Graded Structure: Implications for the Nature of Concepts. In U. Neisser (ed.), Concepts and Conceptual Development: Ecological and Intellectual Factors in Categorization. Cambridge University Press. 101-140.
Lawrence W. Barsalou (1999). Perceptual Symbol Systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.
Lawrence W. Barsalou, W. Kyle Simmons, Aron K. Barbey & Christine D. Wilson (2003). Grounding Conceptual Knowledge in Modality-Specific Systems. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):84-91.
Paul Bloom (1996). Intention, History, and Artifact Concepts. Cognition 60 (1):1-29.
Citations of this work BETA
Edouard Machery (2011). Thought Experiments and Philosophical Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):191-214.
Antonio Diéguez (2013). Life as a Homeostatic Property Cluster. Biological Theory 7 (2):180-186.
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