David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialogue 30 (1991):3-32 (1991)
I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and rational decision rules. I argue that Maximizing Rationality necessarily structures conclusive reasons for action. Thus conations of any sort can base rational choices only if the conations are structured like a coherent preference function; rational actions maximize on such functions. Maximization-constraining dispositions cannot integrate into a coherent preference function.
|Keywords||rationality preferences David Gauthier Constrained Maximization Prisoners Dilemma preference revision why be moral?|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ishtiyaque Haji (1992). Evolution, Altruism, and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Biology and Philosophy 7 (2):161-175.
Joe Mintoff (2000). Is Rational and Voluntary Constraint Possible? Dialogue 39 (02):339-.
Eric M. Cave (1996). The Individual Rationality of Maintaining a Sense of Justice. Theory and Decision 41 (3):229-256.
Eric M. Cave (1998). Habituation and Rational Preference Revision. Dialogue 37 (02):219-.
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