Self-knowledge and the First Person

In M. Sie, Marc Slors & B. Van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Ashgate (2004)
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Abstract

It is a familiar view in the philosophy of mind and action is that for a thought or attitude to constitute a reason for an action is for it to render intelligible, in the light of norms of rationality or reason, that action. However, I can make sense of your actions in this way by crediting you with attitudes that I myself do not hold. Equally, you can do this for my actions. So not all reasons for one’s actions are one’s own reasons. What more is involved in a reason’s being one’s own reason for acting?

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Cynthia Macdonald
University of Manchester

Citations of this work

Entitlement to Self‐Knowledge and Brute Error.Huiming Ren - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):543 – 562.

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