David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cognition 92 (3):1-12 (2004)
Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In this research tradition, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one’s intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. However, recent work in cultural psychology (e.g., Nisbett et al. 2001) has shown systematic cognitive differences between East Asians and Westerners, and some work indicates that this extends to intuitions about philosophical cases (Weinberg et al. 2001). In light of these findings on cultural differences, two experiments were conducted which explored intuitions about reference in Westerners and East Asians. Both experiments indicate that, for certain central cases, Westerners are more likely than East Asians to report intuitions that are consistent with the causal-historical view. These results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture, and the paper argues that this fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference
|Keywords||Semantics Cognitive Psychology Cultural Differences Intuition Epistemology|
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Regina A. Rini (2015). How Not to Test for Philosophical Expertise. Synthese 192 (2):431-452.
Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander (2010). Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters? Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.
Simon Cullen (2010). Survey-Driven Romanticism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296.
S. Matthew Liao, Alex Wiegmann, Joshua Alexander & Gerard Vong (2012). Putting the Trolley in Order: Experimental Philosophy and the Loop Case. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):661-671.
Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.
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