David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Asian Philosophy 18 (3):245 – 266 (2008)
_In this paper, I show that a robust, reflexivist account of self-awareness (such as was defended by Dignga and Dharmakīrti, most phenomenologists, and others) is compatible with reductionist view of persons, and hence with a rejection of the existence of a substantial, separate self. My main focus is on the tension between Buddhist reflexivism and the central Buddhist doctrine of no-self. In the first section of the paper, I give a brief sketch of reflexivist accounts of self-awareness, using the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti as my example. In the next section, I examine reductionism as it relates to accounts of the self. I then, in the third section, argue that a reductionist account of persons can account for the unique features of first-person contents and our deep and multi-layered sense of self_
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References found in this work BETA
J. Campbell (1994). Past, Space, and Self. MIT Press.
Georges B. J. Dreyfus (1997). Recognizing Reality Dharmakirti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Nicholas Rescher (1996). Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy. State University of New York Press.
Derek A. Parfit (1999). Experiences, Subjects, and Conceptual Schemes. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):217-70.
Citations of this work BETA
Charles K. Fink (2012). The ‘Scent’ of a Self: Buddhism and the First-Person Perspective. Asian Philosophy 22 (3):289-306.
Matthew MacKenzie (2010). Enacting the Self: Buddhist and Enactivist Approaches to the Emergence of the Self. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):75-99.
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