The Admissible Contents of Experience

Wiley-Blackwell (2011)
Abstract
Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne (MIT), Alva Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St Catherine’s College, Oxford), Michael Tye (University of Texas, Austin), Richard Price (All Souls College, Oxford) and Susanna Siegel (Harvard University) Essays address the central questions surrounding the content of perceptual experience Investigates how are we able to determine the admissible contents of experience Published in association with the journal Philosophical Quarterly
Keywords Experience  Perception  Evidence  Belief and doubt  PHILOSOPHY / Logic
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Call number B105.E9.A35 2011
ISBN(s) 9781444333350
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