The bleak implications of moral psychology

Neuroethics 3 (3):223-231 (2010)
Abstract
In this article, I focus on two claims made by Appiah in Experiments in Ethics: Doris’s and Harman’s criticism of virtue ethics fails, and moral psychology can be used to identify erroneous moral intuitions. I argue that both claims are erroneous.
Keywords Virtue ethics  Situationism  Character  Implicit bias  Unconscious  Agency  Doris  Harman  Appiah  Moral intuitions  Bias  Moral psychology
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References found in this work BETA
John Dewey (2008). My Pedagogic Creed. In David J. Flinders & Stephen J. Thornton (eds.), The Curriculum Studies Reader. Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA
Mark Alfano (2013). The Most Agreeable of All Vices: Nietzsche as Virtue Epistemologist. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (4):767-790.
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