The Cambridge Revolt Against Idealism: Was There Ever an Eden?

Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2):135-146 (2012)
Abstract
According to one creation myth, analytic philosophy emerged in Cambridge when Moore and Russell abandoned idealism in favour of naive realism: every word stood for something; it was only after “the Fall,” Russell's discovery of his theory of descriptions, that they realized some complex phrases (“the present King of France”) didn't stand for anything. It has become a commonplace of recent scholarship to object that even before the Fall, Russell acknowledged that such phrases may fail to denote. But we need to go further: even before the Fall, Russell had taken an altogether more discerning approach to the ontology of logic and relations than is usually recognized
Keywords Russell  relations  Wittgenstein  logical constants
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    A. J. Ayer (1971). Russell and Moore. Cambridge,Harvard University Press.

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