David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:18 - 30 (1978)
In the course of his long development, Kant's concept of matter changed somewhat, while his concept of scientific explanation changed considerably. Both developments achieved a coherent integration in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Using this developmental background, the present paper argues that the Foundations should be interpreted as an attempted rational reconstruction of the mechanics of Newton and Euler. Kant attempted to do this by constructing a concept of matter that would confer a Leibnizian intelligibility on Newtonian mechanics, and also accord with Kant's theories on the nature of concepts and their role in scientific explanation.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael Friedman (2012). Newton and Kant: Quantity of Matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):482-503.
Michela Massimi (2011). Kant's Dynamical Theory of Matter in 1755, and its Debt to Speculative Newtonian Experimentalism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):525-543.
Thomas Sturm (2001). How Not to Investigate the Human Mind: Kant on the Impossibility of Empirical Psychology. In Eric Watkins (ed.), Kant and the Sciences. Oxford University Press
Hein Berg (2011). Kant's Conception of Proper Science. Synthese 183 (1):7-26.
Cory D. Wright (2012). Mechanistic Explanation Without the Ontic Conception. European Journal of Philosophy of Science 2 (3):375-394.
Steffen Ducheyne (2011). Kant and Whewell on Bridging Principles Between Metaphysics and Science. Kant-Studien 102 (1):22-45.
Hein van den Berg (2011). Kant's Conception of Proper Science. Synthese 183 (1):7-26.
Howard Duncan (1984). Inertia, the Communication of Motion, and Kant's Third Law of Mechanics. Philosophy of Science 51 (1):93-119.
Kenneth R. Westphal (1995). Kant’s Proof of the Law of Inertia. In H. Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the 8th International Kant Congress. Marquette University Press
Stathis Psillos (2007). Past and Contemporary Perspectives on Explanation. In Theo A. F. Kuipers (ed.), General Philosophy of Science. North Holland 2007--97.
Kenneth R. Westphal (1995). Kant's Dynamic Constructions. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:381-429.
Michael Friedman (2001). Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University. Csli Publications.
Edward A. MacKinnon (1972). The Problem of Scientific Realism. New York,Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Martin Schönfeld (2000). The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads14 ( #180,136 of 1,725,260 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #349,101 of 1,725,260 )
How can I increase my downloads?