David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 1 (4):398–412 (2006)
This article critically examines the contemporary resurgence of empiricism (or “neo-empiricism”) in philosophy, psychology, neuropsychology, and artificial intelligence. This resurgence is an important and positive development. It is the first time that this centuries-old empiricist approach to cognition is precisely formulated in the context of cognitive science and neuroscience. Moreover, neo-empiricists have made several findings that challenge amodal theories of concepts and higher cognition. It is argued, however, that the theoretical foundations of and the empirical evidence for neo-empiricism are not as strong as is usually claimed by its proponents. The empirical evidence for and against neo-empiricism is discussed in detail.
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Pierre Jacob (2012). Embodying the Mind by Extending It. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):33-51.
Edouard Machery (2010). Précis of Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
Collin Rice (2013). Concept Empiricism, Content, and Compositionality. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):567-583.
Edouard Machery (2010). The Heterogeneity of Knowledge Representation and the Elimination of Concept. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):231-244.
Edouard Machery (2010). Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz. Mind and Language 25 (5):634-646.
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