Philosophy Compass 1 (4):398–412 (2006)
|Abstract||This article critically examines the contemporary resurgence of empiricism (or “neo-empiricism”) in philosophy, psychology, neuropsychology, and artificial intelligence. This resurgence is an important and positive development. It is the first time that this centuries-old empiricist approach to cognition is precisely formulated in the context of cognitive science and neuroscience. Moreover, neo-empiricists have made several findings that challenge amodal theories of concepts and higher cognition. It is argued, however, that the theoretical foundations of and the empirical evidence for neo-empiricism are not as strong as is usually claimed by its proponents. The empirical evidence for and against neo-empiricism is discussed in detail.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jesse Prinz (2010). Can Concept Empiricism Forestall Eliminativism? Mind and Language 25 (5):612-621.
Carl G. Hempel (1950). Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning. 11 Rev. Intern. De Philos 41:41-63.
David J. Chalmers (2011). Revisability and Conceptual Change in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". Journal of Philosophy 108 (8):387-415.
Harold Morick (1972). Challenges to Empiricism. Belmont, Calif.,Wadsworth Pub. Co..
Steven G. Crowell (2009). Transcendental Logic and Minimal Empiricism : Lask and McDowell on the Unboundedness of the Conceptual. In Rudolf A. Makkreel & Sebastian Luft (eds.), Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy. Indiana University Press.
Edouard Machery (2009). Doing Without Concepts. Oxford University Press.
James Ladyman (2000). What's Really Wrong with Constructive Empiricism? Van Fraassen and the Metaphysics of Modality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):837-856.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads40 ( #33,678 of 722,753 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,437 of 722,753 )
How can I increase my downloads?