Thought experiments and philosophical knowledge

Metaphilosophy 42 (3):191-214 (2011)
Abstract
Abstract: While thought experiments play an important role in contemporary analytic philosophy, much remains unclear about thought experiments. In particular, it is still unclear whether the judgments elicited by thought experiments can provide evidence for the premises of philosophical arguments. This article argues that, if an influential and promising view about the nature of the judgments elicited by thought experiments is correct, then many thought experiments in philosophy fail to provide any evidence for the premises of philosophical arguments
Keywords philosophical expertise  thought experiments  skepticism  intuitions
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Jennifer Culbertson & Steven Gross (2009). Are Linguists Better Subjects? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):721-736.
Donald Davidson (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.

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Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2003). When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 34 (2):305-322.
David Atkinson (2003). When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (2):305 - 322.
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