The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Truth-Making

Philosophical Papers 31 (1):27-37 (2002)
Abstract
There is no single problem of universals but a family of difficulties that treat of a variety of interwoven metaphysical, epistemological, logical and semantic themes. This makes the problem of universals resistant to canonical reduction (to a ‘once-and-for-all’ concern). In particular, the problem of universals cannot be reduced to the problem of supplying truth-makers for sentences that express sameness of type. This is (in part) because the conceptual distinction between numerical and qualitative identity must first be drawn before a sentence is eligible to be supplied with truth-makers. The case is made through a consideration of a recent argument by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra.
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    Fraser MacBride (2011). Relations and Truthmaking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):161-179.
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