The truth of scientific claims

Philosophy of Science 49 (3):437-462 (1982)
The idea that science aspires to and routinely achieves truths about the world has been challenged in recent writings. Rather than beginning with a theory of scientific development, or of scientific explanation, we begin with a consideration of truth claims in ordinary discourse, particularly with Davidson's truth-functional semantics. Next we consider the way in which some framework features of ordinary language discourse are extended to and modified in scientific discourse. Two areas are treated in more detail: quantum theory, and the peculiar problem of semantic entailment it involves; and quantum field theory. These supply a basis for criticizing some historicist and logicist treatments of the truth of scientific claims
Keywords Truth, Davidson, quantum mechanics, quantum field theory
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DOI 10.1086/289070
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James T. Cushing (1982). A Response. Synthese 50 (1):109 - 123.

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