Philosophy of Science 49 (3):437-462 (1982)
|Abstract||The idea that science aspires to and routinely achieves truths about the world has been challenged in recent writings. Rather than beginning with a theory of scientific development, or of scientific explanation, we begin with a consideration of truth claims in ordinary discourse, particularly with Davidson's truth-functional semantics. Next we consider the way in which some framework features of ordinary language discourse are extended to and modified in scientific discourse. Two areas are treated in more detail: quantum theory, and the peculiar problem of semantic entailment it involves; and quantum field theory. These supply a basis for criticizing some historicist and logicist treatments of the truth of scientific claims|
|Keywords||Truth, Davidson, quantum mechanics, quantum field theory|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Duncan Macintosh (1994). Partial Convergence and Approximate Truth. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):153-170.
Mario Alai (2012). Levin and Ghins on the “No Miracle” Argument and Naturalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):85-110.
Edward MacKinnon (1984). Scientific Progress and Conceptual Consistency. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:137 - 145.
Nic Damnjanovic (2010). New Wave Deflationism. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
Howard Sankey (2001). Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defence. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 98 (98):35-54.
Jacob Busch (2011). Scientific Realism and the Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism: A Marriage Made in Hell. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):307-325.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads17 ( #71,199 of 550,273 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,450 of 550,273 )
How can I increase my downloads?