David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 153 (1):123-142 (2011)
I argue that we should reject the sparse view that there are or could be only a small number of rather distinct senses. When one appreciates this then one can see that there is no need to choose between the standard criteria that have been proposed as ways of individuating the senses—representation, phenomenal character, proximal stimulus and sense organ—or any other criteria that one may deem important. Rather, one can use these criteria in conjunction to form a fine-grained taxonomy of the senses. We can think of these criteria as defining a multidimensional space within which we can locate each of the senses that we are familiar with and which also defines the space of possible senses there could be
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
Fiona Macpherson (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
Susanna Siegel (2010). Do Visual Experiences Have Contents? In Bence -Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford
Fiona Macpherson (2006). Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.
Richard Gray (2005). On the Concept of a Sense. Synthese 147 (3):461-475.
Citations of this work BETA
Richard Gray (2013). Is There a Space of Sensory Modalities? Erkenntnis 78 (6):1259-1273.
Mirko Farina (2013). Neither Touch nor Vision: Sensory Substitution as Artificial Synaesthesia? Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):639-655.
Robert Foley (2015). The Case for Characterising Type-2 Blindsight as a Genuinely Visual Phenomenon. Consciousness and Cognition 32:56-67.
Kai Kaspar, Sabine König, Jessika Schwandt & Peter König (2014). The Experience of New Sensorimotor Contingencies by Sensory Augmentation. Consciousness and Cognition 28:47-63.
Matthew Fulkerson (2014). Rethinking the Senses and Their Interactions: The Case for Sensory Pluralism. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
Similar books and articles
Fiona Macpherson (2011). Individuating the Senses. In The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
Matthew Nudds (2004). The Significance of the Senses. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):31-51.
Kevin C. Klement (2003). The Number of Senses. Erkenntnis 58 (3):303 - 323.
Matthew Nudds (2009). Discriminating Senses. The Philosophers' Magazine 45 (45):92-98.
Mohan Matthen (2015). The Individuation of the Senses. In Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press 567-586.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2012). What is Touch? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):413 - 432.
Benny Shanon (1991). Representations - Senses and Reasons. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):355-74.
Richard Gray (2011). On the Nature of the Senses. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press
Matthew Nudds (2011). The Senses as Psychological Kinds. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford
Kc Klement (2010). The Senses of Functions in the Logic of Sense and Denotation. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):153-188.
Louw Feenstra & Johannes Borgstein (2003). The Senses in Perspective. Ludus Vitalis 11 (20):135-157.
Added to index2010-10-05
Total downloads173 ( #21,374 of 1,911,519 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #54,890 of 1,911,519 )
How can I increase my downloads?