David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion. Oup Oxford (2011)
To assert something is to perform a certain kind of act. This act is different in kind both from other speech acts, like questions, requests, commands, promises, and apologies, and from acts that are not speech acts, like toast buttering and inarticulate yodeling. My question, then is this: what features of an act qualify it as an assertion, and not one of these other kinds of act? To focus on a particular example: in uttering “Bill will close the window,” one might be practicing English pronunciation, asserting that Bill will close the window, or requesting that Bill close the window. What makes it the case that one is doing one of these and not another?
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Karl Schafer (2014). Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective‐Dependence in Metaethics1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):68-101.
Mikkel Gerken (2012). Discursive Justification and Skepticism. Synthese 189 (2):373-394.
J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon (2011). Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support. Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.
Stefan Wintein (2014). Alternative Ways for Truth to Behave When There's No Vicious Reference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):665-690.
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