Synthese 75 (1):25 - 44 (1988)
|Abstract||A case is made for supposing that the total probability accounted for in a decision analysis is less than unity. This is done by constructing a measure on the set of all codes for computable functions in such a way that the measure of every effectively accountable subset is bounded by a number <1. The consistency of these measures with the Savage axioms for rational preference is established. Implications for applied decision theory are outlined.|
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